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Introduction 
The Greek elections that took place on 6 
May 2012 resulted in a severe political 
stalemate. As no parliamentary majority 
could be found, the country is heading 
towards new elections on 17 June. The stakes 
are particularly high. Elections will be crucial 
for the economic adjustment programme that 
Greece and its international lenders agreed 
upon, as well as, in the end, Greece’s 
membership of the eurozone. 
Based on the current situation, four post-
election scenarios for Greece seem possible: 
1) The adjustment programme is maintained; 
2) The adjustment programme is modified; 
3) The adjustment programme is abandoned, 
but Greece stays in the eurozone; 
4) The adjustment programme is abandoned 
and Greece leaves the eurozone. 
This policy brief discusses each of these 
scenarios. As will become clear, not all of 
them are viable beyond the short-term. 
Scenario 1: The adjustment programme 
is maintained 
Scenario 
The Greek government, backed by a majority 
in the Greek parliament, supports the 
adjustment programme as it has been agreed 
The results of the Greek elections 
on 17 June are of crucial 
importance for both the country 
itself and the eurozone. This Policy 
Brief outlines the possible post-
election scenarios. It argues that an 
intelligent modification of the 
current adjustment programme is 
the best course of action. Other 
policy choices would likely have a 
worse outcome, as they would 
either underestimate the 
resentment of the current 
programme among Greeks or risk 
leading to the country’s exit from 
the eurozone. 
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upon by Greece and the Troika (the 
European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the IMF). 
Likelihood 
International lenders favour this outcome. 
However, based on the election results of 6 
May, this is an unlikely scenario. Only a third 
of Greek voters voted for parties favouring 
the adjustment programme as it currently 
stands. In addition, even the mainstream 
parties now seek to revise the programme to 
a certain extent, in spite of previous pledges.  
Nonetheless, a large majority of Greek voters 
want to remain in the eurozone, and 
traditional parties might still gain a 
parliamentary majority in the new elections. 
This gives clout to the international lenders 
in demanding the execution of the current 
programme, making the scenario somewhat 
more likely. 
Consequences 
As the current programme focuses to a large 
extent on budget cuts, there is a risk that 
maintaining it will deepen Greece’s economic 
recession. This will render the programme 
even less popular in Greece, making its 
future implementation politically most 
difficult. Therefore, even if the scenario 
would materialise, its longevity is improbable. 
Furthermore, maintaining the current 
programme will not end difficulties in 
Greece. It seems illusionary to believe that 
efforts beyond the current bailout will not be 
necessary. 
Scenario 2: The adjustment programme 
is modified 
Scenario 
The current adjustment programme is revised 
or “complemented” by new measures. These 
new measures could, inter alia, include: 
 Spreading the reforms, notably the fiscal 
consolidation, over a longer period. The 
IMF indicated even before the elections 
that this should be considered1. The 
adjustment programme indeed allows for 
such a revision2; 
 Putting a strong emphasis on Greece and 
other weakened Member States in a future 
Growth Pact. Such measures should 
notably include investment projects, 
financed by the EU and private partners; 
 Meaningful progress on European 
solidarity instruments. This includes 
Eurobonds (the partial pooling of 
sovereign debt issuances among eurozone 
countries) and a European deposit 
guarantee scheme (a guarantee of bank 
deposits at the European level); 
 A new debt restructuring, including public 
debt held by the EU and the IMF. 
Likelihood 
It would prove most difficult to agree on 
changes or complements to the adjustment 
programme. On the one hand, EU leaders 
indicated that they are not willing to 
renegotiate the adjustment programme. On 
the other hand, most Greek political parties 
call for at least a radical overhaul of the 
programme. A Greek government that 
                                                 
1 IMF, Request for Extended Arrangement Under 
the Extended Fund Facility, 9 March 2012, p.17. 
2 European Commission, The Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece, Annex 3: 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific 
Economic Policy Conditionality, March 2012, pp. 
113-114. 
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indicates its willingness to reform might be 
able to obtain some concessions. Yet, far-
reaching demands would be rejected by the 
Troika. 
Despite these difficulties, a modification of 
the programme is probable, as the other 
scenarios seem even less desirable for either 
Greece or the eurozone. The key to a 
successful modification of Greece’s 
adjustment programme lies in finding a 
proper mix that is acceptable for both Greece 
and the Troika. 
Consequences 
The consequences of this scenario depend on 
the modifications to the adjustment 
programme. A growth programme and 
increased solidarity could have clear positive 
effects, both on market sentiments and on 
Greek ownership of the programme. 
However, a revision of the programme would 
also set a hazardous precedent. It would 
reduce the eurozone’s means to steer the 
future reform process in Greece. Other 
countries under financial assistance would see 
the revision as an indication that their 
programme can be softened as well. This is 
notably the case for Portugal, for which a 
second bailout may prove necessary. 
Concessions with regard to the programme 
would also intensify the drive towards 
slowing down fiscal consolidation in other 
eurozone countries.  
This scenario would provide a short-term 
remedy for the current deadlock. Yet, it is 
questionable whether a compromise 
agreement would lead to a convincing and 
successful long-term strategy for Greece. 
Scenario 3: The adjustment programme 
is abandoned, but Greece stays in the 
eurozone 
Scenario 
The adjustment programme is completely 
abandoned, but the Greek government 
wishes to stay in the eurozone nonetheless. 
Likelihood 
This scenario could occur either because the 
Troika agrees to support Greece despite lack 
of agreement on a revision of the current 
bailout, or because Greece is confident it can 
function without external financing. Neither 
scenario is likely or sustainable.  
Consequences 
The abandonment of the programme would 
lead to the non-disbursement of the planned 
financial assistance by the EU and the IMF. 
In order to keep Greece in the eurozone and 
prevent a default, Greece’s lenders might 
nonetheless agree to temporarily continue 
financial support.  
Otherwise, Greece could try to avoid running 
out of financial means by (temporarily) 
stopping repayment of its creditors and 
giving out debt certificates for part of its 
payments, similar to the IOUs (I owe you) 
that were used by California3. In the short-
term, Greece’s financial sector would also 
crucially depend on the ongoing support 
from the ECB which would have to cease at 
some point4, triggering a banking collapse 
and a Greek eurozone exit. 
                                                 
3 Greece’s deficit excluding interest repayments (the 
primary deficit) is forecast by the Commission to 
reach 1% of GDP in 2012. This makes such an 
exercise conceivable in theory. 
4 Although Emergency Liquidity Assistance is 
provided at its own risk by the Greek Central Bank, 
the ECB would not tolerate such a deviation from 
its own monetary policy given the political context. 
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In sum, the situation would not be viable 
beyond a few months. A more stable 
medium-term solution would then become 
necessary. This would either be a 
modification of the adjustment programme 
(scenario 2) or an exit from the eurozone 
(scenario 4). 
Scenario 4: The adjustment programme 
is abandoned and Greece leaves the 
eurozone 
Scenario 
The adjustment programme is abandoned as 
no compromise between parties can be 
found on its modification. Greece leaves the 
eurozone as its lenders stop providing 
assistance5. 
Likelihood 
This scenario is unlikely in the short-term in 
so far that EU leaders and a majority of 
Greeks do not favour a Greek exit. Yet, it 
could result from a political deadlock over 
the adjustment programme, as well as a 
massive silent bank-run reaching 
unsustainable proportions. 
Consequences 
A Greek exit would present substantial legal 
and practical challenges. It would 
furthermore have considerable economic 
consequences extending well beyond the 
eurozone. Rough estimates put the additional 
economic loss for Greece at 7.5% of GDP. 
For the eurozone, a Greek exit would cut 
GDP by 1.6% on average6. The financial 
                                                 
5 In theory, the other eurozone countries could 
decide to expel Greece from the monetary union. 
However, this is politically and legally next to 
impossible. Therefore, this scenario is not 
discussed. 
6 CLIFFE, M., EMU Break-up. Pay Now, Pay 
Later. ING, December 2011, p.29 
sector and public finances would be 
particularly impacted, both directly and 
indirectly. 
The direct impact of a Greek exit followed by 
debt restructuring and currency depreciation 
is that Greek financial assets held by banks 
throughout the eurozone would lose most of 
their value7. A Greek default would impact 
public finances of other eurozone members 
because of the previous loans to Greece8. 
The European Investment Bank and ECB 
Greek debt holdings would also be exposed 
to important losses9. 
The indirect impact of the Greek exit - the 
contagion effect - is likely to be severe in 
sovereign debt markets as government bond 
yield spreads against Germany would 
increase, in particular in the most vulnerable 
countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy. Risk aversion could force several 
countries out of the markets as they would 
face interest rates above sustainable levels. 
Investors and depositors, fearing for their 
money, would pull-out of weak countries, 
potentially pushing fragile European banks 
into bankruptcy, further damaging public 
finances and perhaps forcing these countries 
to leave the eurozone. This self-reinforcing 
dynamic would be particularly strong in weak 
countries as a considerable amount of 
                                                 
7 Eurozone banks have 52bn EUR in remaining 
exposures, mainly to Greek corporations. Rest of 
the world exposure is 11.4bn EUR (the UK 
representing nearly 65%). See: NORDVIG, J., 
Preparing for a Greek Eurozone exit: Part 2. G10 
FX insights, Nomura, May 2012 
8 Total direct loan exposure reaches 130bn EUR, 
representing 1.4% of the eurozone GDP. See: 
DRAKOPOULOS, D., NORDVIG, J., Preparing 
for a Greek Eurozone exit: Part 3. G10 FX insights, 
Nomura, May 2012 
9 Together with the EIB, the ECB holds 43bn EUR 
of Greek assets (and 130bn EUR in Target 2 and 
notes), see supra. 
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sovereign debt is held by domestic banks. In 
the worst-case scenario, a Greek exit, having 
demonstrated the end of the claimed 
irrevocability of the euro, could be the first 
domino leading to a break-up of the 
eurozone. 
The extent to which such a contagion could 
be mitigated would depend on the belief that 
Greece is different from other weak 
countries. The deterrence effect of the 
firewall (EFSF/ESM) would hence be 
evaluated by market forces. If it proves 
insufficient, required intervention of the 
EFSF/ESM might necessitate remaining 
eurozone members providing it with extra 
capacity and, possibly, additional fresh 
capital. 
Meanwhile, the ECB could be forced to act 
beyond its formal mandate in order to back-
stop the contagion by engaging in massive 
bond-buying to support the affected 
countries. The ECB would also need to 
support the financial sector by easing 
refinancing conditions and providing 
emergency liquidity assistance to distressed 
banks.  
Additional bolder actions to limit the risk of 
contagion could be (re)considered. These 
could involve the introduction of Eurobonds 
for countries not yet involved in a bail-out 
programme or a more effective ESM backed 
by the ECB. A comprehensive financial 
sector crisis management scheme at the EU 
level could also be adopted, allowing for 
direct support for bank recapitalization and 
better protection of depositors and tax 
payers.  
 
Conclusion 
The Greek elections will constitute a game 
changer for the country’s bailout. After the 
elections in June, the continuation of the 
adjustment programme as it currently stands 
will likely prove to be politically unviable in 
Greece. At the same time, international 
lenders are forcefully excluding any 
programme revision. By insisting that the 
elections should be considered as a 
referendum on eurozone membership, they 
hope to influence their outcome. While 
Europe should indeed remain firm on the 
need for reforms in Greece, such a radical 
strategy could prove a mistake for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, the strategy could backfire. 
Brinkmanship by Greece and the 
international lenders could close the door on 
a compromise. International pressure could 
therefore drive Greece towards renouncing 
the assistance programme altogether. 
Secondly, the current strategy deteriorates the 
outlook for Greece. It adds further 
uncertainty to Greece’s future in the 
eurozone, thereby increasing its economic 
and fiscal predicament and fuelling further 
bank withdrawal by depositors. As a result, 
Greece’s financial assistance programme is 
becoming increasingly inadequate. Ultimately, 
escalating panic could lead to a point where a 
negotiated solution comes too late. 
Given the problems attached to both 
maintaining and abandoning the programme, 
the only viable scenario seems a “smart” 
revision of the current programme (i.e. 
scenario 2 of this Policy Brief). Such a 
revision should signal that the vital policy 
reforms have to be implemented. At the 
same time, specific modifications can be 
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made, as they are likely to be beneficial for 
both Greece and the eurozone. 
The timeframe of reforms that particularly 
undercut growth should be reconsidered, 
taking into account the worsened outlook 
(deeper recession, capital flight...). This would 
make the programme more credible and 
might result in a certain degree of Greek 
ownership.  
Moreover, the eurozone should take steps 
towards more European solidarity. Several 
elements could be considered, such as a 
roadmap towards Eurobonds, a European 
deposit guarantee and a comprehensive 
Growth Pact with a particular focus on 
troubled Member States. 
Such European solidarity would crucially 
demonstrate to Greece that European 
partners are willing to take a fair share of the 
burden if the country is willing to pursue its 
reform programme. Other eurozone 
countries, for their part, should accept such 
burden sharing as a necessary step-up 
towards a stable monetary union. Stronger 
eurozone solidarity instruments might be 
difficult to accept for some countries. 
However, without such measures the 
sovereign debt crisis risks deteriorating even 
further, rendering more solidarity 
unavoidable. 
A compromise will not be easy to forge. 
Nonetheless, decisive action should be taken 
to alleviate the risk that the current stalemate 
and growing panic degenerate into a chaotic 
outcome that no one actually wants. 
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